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ABSTRACT
IP source addresses are often the only initial lead when in-
vestigating cybercrime in the Internet. Unfortunately, source
addresses are easily forged, which can protect the culprits
and lead to false accusations. We describe a new method for
packet attestation in the Internet. Packet attestation estab-
lishes whether or not a given IP packet was sent by a par-
ticular network subscriber. This capability allows network
operators to verify the source of malicious traffic and to val-
idate complaints, identity requests, and DMCA take-down
notices against their clients. As a result, innocent users can-
not be falsely accused, while the culprits no longer enjoy
plausible deniability. Support for packet attestation can be
deployed incrementally by ISPs, and requires no changes to
end hosts or to the network core.
1. INTRODUCTION
With cybercrime on the rise, governments, law enforce-
ment agencies, and copyright owners are increasingly
calling for better attribution on the Internet [25]. Here,
attribution means the ability to identify whoever is re-
sponsible for sending a given set of network packets.
With reliable attribution in place, it would be much
easier to quickly establish countermeasures to an ongo-
ing attack and to hold cybercriminals accountable for
their actions.
Unfortunately, reliable attribution is difficult because
there is no direct support for it in the Internet—packets
do not have “license plates” that tie them irrefutably
to the party responsible for sending them [8]. More-
over, adding such a capability to the Internet would face
substantial technical, legal, political and administrative
challenges. It would need strong user authentication
and secure software on every network-attached device,
and it would require an internationally accepted user
certification authority and jurisdiction to bring crimi-
nals to justice no matter where they reside. It would
also raise privacy concerns, and potentially undermine
the Internet as a platform for whistleblowers and dissi-
dents. Worst of all, such a capability would still not be
sufficient to catch sophisticated cybercriminal who rely
on multi-stage attacks through a series of compromised
machines owned and operated by other victims [7].
Clark and Landau [8] recently made similar points
and added that not only is strong attribution insuffi-
cient to cover multi-stage attacks, it is also not strictly
necessary to investigate cybercrime. What victims and
law enforcement agencies need most is evidence suffi-
cient to (1) confidently take immediate steps to stop an
ongoing attack, and (2) provide a starting point for an
investigation of the responsible party. In serious cases,
such an investigation must in any case rely on addi-
tional evidence, obtained through a search warrant or
by following the trail of money, to be admissible in a
court of law.
Today, network administrators and law enforcement
agents rely on circumstantial evidence, such as log en-
tries and IP addresses, to attribute traffic to a source.
For example, if a server log contains an entry that in-
dicates illegal traffic from a particular IP address, this
IP address is combined with other information (such as
IP prefix ownership and DHCP server logs) to identify
a particular subscriber, who is then presumed responsi-
ble [28].
Relying on such evidence alone for attribution is prob-
lematic. First, the process involves several manual steps,
which is labor-intensive and error-prone. The conse-
quences of mistakes can be severe: innocent users can
be falsely accused [11,36] or even go to jail [16]. Second,
it is easy to create a perfect forgery of a log entry that
incriminates an arbitrary user—all that is needed is that
user’s current IP address. Researchers at the University
of Washington have demonstrated the problem by gen-
erating DMCA take-down notices against printers and
wireless access points [27], but it is not difficult to imag-
ine the damage a malicious attacker could do. Finally,
when a real cybercriminal is caught, he can plausibly
deny responsibility by pointing to the weakness of the
evidence [12, 19].
In this paper, we propose to add a capability to the
Internet that provides evidence of a packet’s immedi-
ate origin. The evidence is strong enough to (1) enable
swift and confident action to stop an ongoing attack, (2)
convince ISPs to take action against a subscriber who
appears to originate offensive traffic, (3) protect falsely
accused subscribers, and (4) in the case of a multi-stage
attack, provide a starting point for an investigation of
the ultimately responsible party. Moreover, our pro-
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posed technique protects users’ privacy and can be de-
ployed today.
Specifically, we propose a primitive called packet at-
testation, which determines whether a given set of pack-
ets was sent over a given access link. Thus, packet at-
testation corroborates the evidence available today, by
verifying that an alleged attack packet originated from
the access link associated with the packet’s source IP
address. The primitive strikes a favorable tradeoff be-
tween the strength of the evidence it provides on the one
hand, and its privacy implications and deployability on
the other.
Attestations preserve user privacy because they only
confirm what the querier already knows; a malicious
querier would have to guess both the complete payload
of a packet and its transmission time to learn anything
nontrivial. At the same time, attestations corroborate
the circumstantial evidence available about an attack.
In case of a negative attestation, they protect users from
false accusations. In case of a positive attestation, they
give victims and network operators a basis for decisive
steps to stop an attack, and law enforcement agencies
a basis to start an investigation in serious cases.
Packet attestation does not require changes to the In-
ternet architecture and can be deployed incrementally
in the current Internet. Indeed, the technical require-
ments are surprisingly simple: it is sufficient to add
a few strategically placed boxes that record a hash of
every packet they see, and that store these hashes for
a limited time. Its main overhead is storage; we esti-
mate that a global deployment would require, on aver-
age, about 32 commodity hard disks per autonomous
system. Packet attestation does not require changes
to existing core routers, protocols, applications, or end
hosts. It also does not increase packet sizes or require
cryptography on the critical path.
To test whether a deployment of packet attestation
would be practical, we have conducted a feasibility study
to estimate the cost of a global deployment, and we have
built and evaluated a prototype to measure both perfor-
mance and possible adverse effects on key performance
metrics, such as packet loss rate and jitter. Taken to-
gether, our results indicate that, at least in principle,
a deployment of packet attestation would be feasible
today.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We dis-
cuss related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we make
the case for packet attestation in the Internet. Next, we
describe a practical system for packet attestation called
HAL in Sections 4 and 5, and we perform a feasibility
study in Section 6. In Section 7, we discuss options for
incremental deployment. Section 8 describes how HAL
can be applied to automate complaint management at
ISPs, Section 9 discusses possible variants and exten-
sions, and Section 10 concludes this paper.
2. RELATED WORK
Spoofing defenses: The most common approach to
attribution in the literature has been to defend against
spoofing. For example, ingress and egress filtering [10,
18] check the source address at the edge, where the per-
missible address ranges are known. If a spoofing defense
were ubiquitously deployed and diligently used, the re-
cipient of a packet could be sure that the packet has
the correct source address. However, unlike packet at-
testation, such a packet could not be used as evidence
to convince a third party. If Alice complains to Charlie
that Bob has been attacking her and presents the of-
fending packet, Charlie cannot be sure that the packet
was actually sent by Bob, since Alice could easily have
fabricated it.
Traceback: Another approach to the spoofing prob-
lem is to mark each packet in the network in such a way
that the recipient can determine its true origin, even
if the source address is incorrect [20, 29, 35]. Trace-
back does not create evidence either: a malicious re-
cipient could easily modify the packets or tamper with
the markings such that they appear to have come from
somewhere else.
AIP and Passport: Some of the more recent sys-
tems rely on cryptography to prevent spoofing: Pass-
port [21] uses MACs and a key distribution system to
detect spoofed packets in the middle of the network;
AIP [1] introduces self-certifying addresses and a challenge-
response mechanism for authenticating packets. As pro-
posed, neither of these two systems creates evidence:
Passport’s hashes cover only the first eight bytes of the
packet payload (which means that the rest of the packet
cannot be validated), while AIP’s challenge-response
mechanism requires the cooperation of the sender to val-
idate packets and therefore cannot authenticate packets
from malicious senders. It seems feasible to extend AIP
or Passport to also support the primitive we propose
here; however, both systems would still require changes
to the Internet core and to existing applications, while
our proposed solution would require neither.
Collecting packets: This paper is not the first to
propose that the network remember a digest of every
packet. For example, single-packet traceback [35] does
this as well, although it uses Bloom filters to limit the
required storage and therefore cannot reliably identify
a specific packet.
Application-layer authentication: Several appli-
cation protocols provide some form of authentication;
for example, TLS, HTTPS, and IPSec can authenticate
either one or both endpoints. This can be used for at-
tribution, but only for traffic that conforms to one of
these protocols. HAL, on the other hand, works even
when the attacker uses a non-authenticated protocol or
floods the victim with random garbage.
Identifiers: Several papers have proposed changes
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Alice BobBob's ISP
Charlie
Internet
I got offending 
traffic with Bob's 
IP address in it!
Did these packets
actually come from 
Bob's access link?
Access link
(a) Complaint handling today
Alice BobBob's ISP
Internet
I got the following
packets:               . 
Charlie
(b) Complaint handling with packet attestation
Figure 1: Today, a third party has no reliable way to verify a complaint (left). With packet attestation, the
complainant can give the offending packets to the third party as evidence, and the third party can request an
attestation to verify them (right).
to the Internet’s addressing scheme such that each ad-
dress contains a stable, globally unique endpoint iden-
tifier [1, 9, 26]. This change would eliminate the error-
prone step of mapping IP addresses to endpoints. How-
ever, by themselves these proposals would neither pre-
vent spoofing nor enable the recipient to convince a
third party that a given packet is genuine.
Heuristics: Some systems use heuristics to attribute
traffic to users. For example, HostTracker [38] tracks
bindings between hosts and IP addresses over time by
extracting application-level IDs from traffic logs. Host-
Tracker’s main focus is on analysis, so it need not iden-
tify all traffic, and a certain misclassification rate is ac-
ceptable. However, its output could be useful as a com-
plement to HAL, e.g., to distinguish between multiple
users behind an access link.
Prevention and mitigation: Off-by-default [3] is
a clean-slate design of the Internet routing infrastruc-
ture, in which hosts explicitly declare the sources from
which they are willing to accept network traffic; shut-
off protocols enable receivers of offending traffic to reac-
tively throttle the sender by sending a “shut-off” mes-
sage [1, 2, 13, 15, 22, 32]. These systems can be used
to prevent or mitigate certain forms of cybercrime, al-
though most of them would require changes to the net-
work and/or to end hosts. We note that, while HAL
addresses a different problem, it can also be used to im-
plement a shut-off service that is effective even against
malicious senders and requires support at the sender’s
edge network only.
Network forensics: Systems like ForNet [31] solve
the problem of reconstructing the events that led to
an attack. These systems are complementary to HAL;
an investigator could use forensics to understand which
packets were part of the attack, and then submit these
packets to HAL to obtain evidence.
PGPA [14] can determine whether a given packet
was sent from a particular source address. This work-
shop paper sketches the design of a system that shares
many of our goals, but differs in some important design
decisions; for example, PGPA requires users to install a
monitor box on their premises, which raises issues about
cost and the possible destruction of evidence. Further-
more, the PGPA paper neither contains a detailed de-
sign nor a feasibility study or experimental results.
To the best of our knowledge, HAL is the first system
that can reliably convince a third party (and not just
the recipient) that a given IP packet is genuine, and
allows access providers to validate complaints against
their subscribers. Moreover, HAL does not require any
changes to end hosts or network core and can be de-
ployed independently by edge networks.
3. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
In this section, we review the limitations in the current
practice of attributing offending network traffic. Then,
we show that packet attestation solves an important
aspect of the problem, and we present a simple but ef-
fective way of implementing this capability.
3.1 Scenario
Figure 1a illustrates the basic scenario we are concerned
with in this paper. There are three parties, Alice, Bob,
and Charlie. Alice contacts Charlie and complains that
she has received some offending network traffic, such as
copyrighted content, spam, or attack traffic, apparently
from Bob. How can Charlie decide whether the traffic
actually originated from Bob’s access link? Moreover,
faced with an accusation that he has sent offending traf-
fic, how can Bob prove his innocence in case Alice is
mistaken or someone has spoofed Bob’s IP address?
Variants of this scenario are frequently occurring in
the Internet today. For instance, the role of Charlie
is often played by an Internet Service Provider (ISP),
and the role of Alice is played by ‘netwatch’ services
such as REN-ISAC, Shadowserver, or SpamCop, or by
lawyers representing copyright holders who file DMCA
take-down notices. A large ISP, such as a university
network, can receive hundreds of such complaints every
month.
3
Note that a defense against spoofing is not sufficient
to handle this scenario. If spoofing were impossible, Al-
ice would learn the sender of any offending packets she
receives, but from Charlie’s perspective the situation
would not change – he could still not be sure that Alice
has actually received the offending packets (she might
simply have made them up) and that the packets have
not been modified somewhere along the path from Alice
to Bob.
3.2 The state of the art
To convince Charlie that the offending network traffic
originated from Bob’s access link, Alice must present
some form of evidence. Today, this evidence typically
consists of log entries or IP addresses. For example,
a complaint about spam might include the offending
message, with full headers included, and a DMCA take-
down notice might contain the date, time, and IP ad-
dress of the alleged violation. The ISP then matches
this information to its own records (often manually).
This practice is not satisfactory, for at least three rea-
sons.
First, the process is prone to clerical errors. For ex-
ample, in 2004, two Wichita residents were accused of
sharing child pornography because of mistaken infor-
mation from their Internet service provider [36], and in
2003, the RIAA had to withdraw a copyright infringe-
ment suit against a Newbury resident because the file-
sharing software she had allegedly used was not even
compatible with her computer [11].
Second, log entries and IP addresses are easily forged.
Recently, a team of researchers was able to provoke
obviously incorrect DMCA take-down notices against
printers and wireless access points [27]. An adversary
could easily use a similar approach to falsely accuse
an innocent individual, with potentially serious conse-
quences for the victim, such as public embarrassment
or even a criminal investigation.
Third, because log entries and IP addresses are so
easily forged, they provide actual offenders with plau-
sible deniability. For example, Roger Duronio, who
was convicted of having planted ‘logic bombs’ in UBS
PaineWebber network, claimed that some unknown third
party had caused the damage but had used IP spoofing
in such a way that the evidence would point to Duro-
nio [12]. A similar argument was used in the case of
Capitol vs. Thomas [19].
3.3 In search for better evidence
The approach we propose is based on three key insights.
First, the key problem with using log entries as evidence
is that they are difficult to verify independently. In the
offline world, this is a key requirement for accepting
evidence. If, for instance, Alice were to accuse Bob of
keying her car, Charlie would not take Alice’s statement
at face value, but rather look for someone other than
Alice or Bob, such as an eye witness, to attest to the
validity of the evidence, i.e., to either confirm or deny
Alice’s claim. Our goal is to apply this successful, time-
tested principle to the online world.
Who could Charlie ask to attest to the validity of Al-
ice’s evidence? Our second key insight is that that this
role naturally falls to Bob’s ISP. First, the ISP (poten-
tially) has all the necessary information, since all traffic
that Bob has sent through his access link must necessar-
ily have passed through the ISP’s network. Second, the
ISP typically has a contract with Bob and is therefore in
a position to attest to Bob’s offline identity. Finally, if
the ISP is a reputable business, it has little to gain from
colluding with Bob, but a lot to lose (such as its busi-
ness and its reputation), so it is reasonable for Charlie
to trust its attestations.
Our third key insight is that Alice can use the of-
fending network traffic itself as evidence. This choice
has many advantages: The evidence is easy for Alice to
collect (e.g., using tcpdump), it is easy for Bob’s ISP
to recognize, and it exists independently of the type of
offending traffic. Most importantly, it is available to-
day – without any changes to applications, protocols,
end-user devices, or network infrastructure.
3.4 Proposed solution: Packet attestation
Based on the above three insights, we propose a prim-
itive called packet attestation. At a high level, packet
attestation works as follows (see also Figure 1b):
1. Each ISP records a hash of each packet (including
payload) that is sent over one of its access links;
2. When Alice receives offending network traffic, she
captures a packet trace and sends it to Charlie as
evidence;
3. Charlie asks any attestation-enabled provider for
the corresponding origin ISP. If Charlie recognizes
the origin ISP as reputable, he sends the packets
and their respective arrival times to that ISP and
asks for an attestation that either 1) these packets
were sent over some specific access link L that this
ISP controls, or 2) these packets were not sent over
any access link that this ISP controls.
4. If the ISP returns a positive attestation, Charlie
believes Alice (and potentially takes further ac-
tion, e.g., asking the ISP to identify the subscriber
of L). Otherwise Charlie ignores Alice’s request.
Of course, this overview glosses over many technical
and nontechnical challenges; for example, the packet
Alice receives is not identical to the packet Bob would
have sent, since some header fields change in the net-
work, and the ability to ask providers about packets sent
by their customers raises privacy concerns. We discuss
these and other challenges in Sections 4 and 5.
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3.5 Is packet attestation the right solution?
Clearly, packet attestation is not as strong as personal
attribution. Here, we briefly describe its limitations,
and we discuss what it would take to remove them.
First, the availability and credibility of a packet at-
testation depends on the support and trustworthiness of
the sender’s ISP. This dependency could be removed by
involving additional networks along the path; however,
this would require support from components in the net-
work core, which would make the system much harder
to deploy.
Second, packet attestations by themselves cannot trace
a multi-stage attack back to the source. This limitation
could be removed by securely tracking data dependen-
cies on end systems; however, this would require secure
software on every network-attached device, which seems
infeasible today.
Third, to obtain a packet attestation, the victim must
have collected at least some packets as evidence. One
could avoid this by storing a complete record of all
transmitted packets (without hashing), which could then
be searched retroactively. However, the existence of
such a record would jeopardize user privacy.
Finally, packet attestations do not directly tie a spe-
cific individual to a specific cybercrime; they merely
confirm that certain packets have been sent over a cer-
tain access link at a certain time. However, to tie pack-
ets to specific individuals, one would seem to require a
global system of CAs that issued keypairs to everyone.
To establish specific crimes, one would need interna-
tional agreement on what constitutes a crime. Given the
diversity of legal and political systems, such an agree-
ment would seem out of reach.
To summarize: On the one hand, while it may be pos-
sible to build a system that avoids some or all of the lim-
itations of packet attestation, such a system would face
considerable technical and non-technical challenges. On
the other hand, we have argued that many of these lim-
itations can be overcome by combining packet attesta-
tions with established forensic techniques, such as fol-
lowing the money or executing search warrants. Packet
attestation is 1) strong enough to address the problems
with today’s state of the art, such as clerical errors or
false accusations; it is 2) potentially useful for verify-
ing complaints, mitigating ongoing attacks, and guid-
ing investigations; and it 3) preserves desirable proper-
ties, such as user privacy, incremental deployability, low
overhead, and technical simplicity. Therefore, we be-
lieve that, in the spectrum of possible solutions, packet
attestation occupies an attractive spot.
3.6 Roadmap
So far, we have made a case for packet attestation as
the network’s contribution to the attribution of cyber-
crimes. In the rest of this paper, we will:
• give a more detailed definition of packet attesta-
tion (Section 4);
• present the design of HAL, a packet attestation
service for the Internet (Section 5);
• show that a global deployment of HAL in the In-
ternet would be feasible (Section 6);
• describe how HAL could be deployed incremen-
tally (Section 7);
• perform a case study to show how HAL could be
used in practice (Section 8); and
• discuss possible variants and extensions of HAL
(Section 9).
4. PACKET ATTESTATION
In this section, we describe the assumptions and the
threat model we use in this paper, define an packet
attestation request, and specify the properties packet
attestation is designed to provide.
4.1 Assumptions
Our design is based on the following assumptions about
providers that support packet attestation:
1. Providers use ingress filtering on their access links;
2. Providers loosely synchronize their clocks;
3. Each provider has a public/private keypair and a
certificate that binds the keypair to its identity;
4. Each access link has a unique identifier.
The first two assumptions are current best practices.
The third assumption could be satisfied in a number of
ways, e.g., by using existing SSL certificates. The final
assumption could be satisfied by using MAC addresses
or any identifier currently used for billing.
4.2 Threat model
We assume that Internet customers may behave arbi-
trarily, but cannot steal or break the providers’ cryp-
tographic keys. In particular, customers can send of-
fending network traffic to other customers, they can
fabricate accusations against innocent customers, and
they can try to use packet attestation to spy on other
customers’ traffic.
We make no assumptions about the nature of the of-
fending traffic. It can be sent by any application and
use any current or future protocol, it can be encrypted,1
or it can consist of raw IP-level packets.
4.3 Attestation requests
Customers can request attestations by invoking a prim-
itive called attest. Given a provider P that supports
packet attestation, a packet p, and a timestamp t, an
invocation of attest (P, p, t) at time t0 returns
1To convince Charlie that the attested traffic is indeed of-
fending, Alice can give him the necessary decryption keys.
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• σP (P,yes, L, p, k, t) if k copies of the packet p have
been sent over access link L in the interval [t −
∆, t + ∆];
• σP (P,no, p, t) if no subscriber of P has sent the
packet p in the interval [t − ∆, t + ∆];
• σP (P
′, p) if the request should be directed to provider
P ′ instead, because P ′ owns the source IP address
recorded in p; or
• nil if t 6∈ [t0 − R, t0].
Here, σP denotes a signature with the provider’s private
key. Two packets p and p′ are considered identical if
they differ at most in the IP header fields that normally
change while the packet is forwarded in the network, i.e.,
the ToS and TTL fields, the IP checksum and any IP
options that can change during forwarding.
The tolerance ∆ is needed to account for propagation
delays and imperfect clock synchronization; it should be
at most a few seconds. The retention time R limits the
required amount of storage space by allowing providers
to discard data after R has elapsed; it should be on the
order of several weeks. Note that, since the attestation
is signed, Alice’s evidence remains verifiable beyond R
as long as she invokes attest before R elapses. Report-
ing the number of identical copies (in the parameter k)
is necessary to obtain attestations for certain denial-of-
service attacks in which the same packet (e.g., a SYN)
is sent many times in short succession.
4.4 How packet attestation protects privacy
A potential concern is that attest could be used to
compromise user privacy, that is, to find out which pack-
ets a given user has sent. Such an attack is theoretically
possible, but practically very difficult because attest
only confirms information that the invoking entity al-
ready has. The attacker would have to guess an entire
packet and the approximate time at which it was sent
in order to get an affirmative attestation. Even if the
attacker knows the time and the likely destination (say,
cnn.com), and if he can guess a common packet (say,
a TCP SYN or an ACK), he would still have to cor-
rectly guess all the header fields, including the source
port number, the TCP sequence number, and the IPID.
If all these fields are properly randomized,2 the attacker
would have to guess at least 64 bits, and thus should ex-
pect to send more than 1018 attestation requests before
getting an affirmative response.
Another privacy-related concern is that an implemen-
tation of attest might require the provider to keep ex-
tensive traffic logs, which could then be subpoenaed.
As we will show in Section 5, this is not the case; it
is sufficient to record a digest of each packet. These
digests protect privacy in the same way as the narrow
2If the sender host does not do this, the provider can ran-
domize the fields, similar to a NAT box (Section 5.6).
attest interface. Even if someone gains offline access
to the entire record, he can only confirm information
he already knows. Anything beyond this would require
guessing an entire packet, which is difficult.
4.5 Properties
Given our assumptions and our threat model, packet
attestation is designed to ensure the following:
1. Evidence is available: If Bob’s provider cor-
rectly implements attest and Bob has sent traffic
T to Alice, Alice can (within the retention period)
obtain a positive attestation that Bob sent T .
2. No false accusations: If Bob’s provider correctly
implements attest and Bob did not send any of-
fending traffic, nobody can obtain evidence of such
traffic against Bob.
3. Exoneration is possible: If Bob’s provider cor-
rectly implements attest and Bob did not send
T to Alice, Bob can (within the retention period)
obtain an attestation that he did not send T .
4. No privacy violations: It is infeasible for Al-
ice or any other customer to use attest to find
out which packets Bob has sent, except for pack-
ets that this customer has previously received or
intercepted.
5. THE HAL SERVICE
Next, we describe the design of HAL (short for “Hash-
ing at the Access Link”), a simple Internet service that
implements attest by recording digests of upstream
packets at every access link.
HAL consists of two types of devices, monitors and
coordinators. A monitor is a simple middlebox that is
attached to a set of access links and records a hash and
a timestamp for each upstream packet. A coordinator
maintains the mapping from IP addresses to monitors.
Each HAL-enabled provider has one coordinator and at
least one monitor.
5.1 HAL coordinators
At any given time, each HAL coordinator is responsible
for a specific set of IP prefixes. The coordinator also
has a keypair for signing attestations about these pre-
fixes, as well as a certificate that binds the keypair to
the prefixes, the IP address of the coordinator, and a
specific time interval. The certificate is signed with the
provider’s master signing key, which, for security rea-
sons, is not stored on the coordinator itself and is only
used offline, to sign certificates.
In addition, each coordinator internally maintains two
lists, an address list and a prefix list. The address list
records all IP addresses that have been assigned to ac-
cess links during the retention time; it is populated,
e.g., from the local DHCP server. The prefix list con-
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Figure 2: Example scenario. The HAL moni-
tor is connected to a mirrored port and receives
copies of all upstream packets.
tains a mapping from IP prefixes and timestamps to
providers and their coordinators. This list is created
and updated as follows. Each provider configures its
coordinator with the address of the coordinators at a
few other HAL-enabled providers, and when a new cer-
tificate is installed, the coordinator uses these addresses
to flood the new certificate to all the other coordinators.
Since prefix assignments change rarely and the to-
tal number of certificates cannot exceed the number of
providers, the bandwidth and storage cost should be
small. Note that the coordinators can delete old cer-
tificates after the retention time has elapsed, but not
before – if a attest query occurs shortly after a pre-
fix has been reassigned to another provider, the query
must be directed to the “old” coordinator.
To obtain an attestation, Alice invokes attest on an
arbitrary coordinator (e.g., the local one, if her provider
supports HAL). If this coordinator is not responsible
for the relevant IP prefix, it consults its prefix list and
redirects Alice to the responsible coordinator. The re-
sponsible coordinator then looks up the source address
and timestamp in its address list to find the relevant
monitor, queries that monitor, produces an attestation
based on the monitor’s response, and finally returns the
attestation back to Alice.
5.2 HAL monitors
Each HAL monitor contains some stable storage, such
as a harddisk or an SSD. When a monitor receives a
packet, it records a digest and a timestamp in its stor-
age. As we will show in Section 6, this simple operation
can be performed at high speed with commodity hard-
ware.
Monitors must be deployed in such a way that each
upstream packet – that is, a packet sent from a sub-
scriber to the Internet – is 1) received by at least one
monitor, and 2) can be reliably associated with a spe-
cific access link. This can be accomplished in several
different ways. The monitors can be directly on the
data path, receiving upstream packets on one port and
forwarding them to another port, or they can be con-
nected to a mirrored port on a switch to get a copy
of each upstream packet (Figure 2). They can be di-
rectly on the access link, next to a DSL access multi-
plexer (DSLAM) or a cable head-end (CMTS), or fur-
ther upstream, receiving packets with MPLS tags from a
DSLAM or CMTS. They can be separate boxes (server
blades running special software) or their functionality
can be integrated into existing equipment.
Although we have separated monitors and coordi-
nators here for clarity of presentation, small providers
could integrate the two components and implement them
both on a single machine.
5.3 Packet digests
Monitors record digests instead of the entire packets
because this saves space, and also because it mitigates
the privacy risk if the monitor is subpoenaed. However,
recall that the monitor records the packets at the source,
whereas attestation requests refer to packets observed at
the receiver or in the network. Since header fields like
the TTL can change in the network, the digest must
not depend on these fields; otherwise the hash of the
evidence will not match the recorded hash.
To avoid this, we use the well-known technique from
Snoeren et al. [35] and mask out any variant parts of
the packet before calculating the digest, specifically the
ToS field, the TTL value, the IP checksum, and any IP
options that are not known to be invariant (the payload
itself is invariant and can therefore be safely included).
For the digest itself, we use a simple SHA-1 hash, but
this choice is not critical; in principle, different moni-
tors could even use different hash algorithms, as long as
the requesters support all the algorithms and properly
negotiate the correct algorithm during each request.
Monitors also record a four-byte timestamp for each
packet, so the overall storage required per packet is
24 bytes.
5.4 Expiring old entries
Monitors store each digest until its minimum retention
time R has elapsed. Setting the value of R involves
a trade-off between the storage requirements and the
ability to obtain an attestation a sufficiently long time
after a packet was transmitted. For example, Alice may
not discover an intrusion attempt until several days af-
ter the incident, or the monitor may be unreachable for
some time. A setting of R on the order of one month
should be sufficient for Alice to discover suspicious traf-
fic and obtain an attestation; and, as we will show in
Section 6.1, the resulting storage requirement is still rea-
sonable. Note that once a packet is attested, the signed
attestation remains valid for a long time.
5.5 Keeping time
Recall that all attestation requests include a specific
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timestamp, and that a negative attestation must be re-
turned when the given timestamp is not within ∆ of
the recorded one, even if the digest is otherwise present.
Thus, we must a) ensure that the monitors record the
correct time, and b) choose ∆ such that the reception
time of a packet as observed by Alice is close enough to
the recorded timestamp for attest to succeed.
If the provider sets a monitor’s clock incorrectly, its
subscribers gain deniability for any packets they send,
since they will be recorded with an incorrect timestamp
and cannot be found by a request that contains the cor-
rect timestamp. To prevent this, monitors could peri-
odically synchronize their clocks via NTP, or they could
be equipped with a WWV receiver similar to the ones
used in radio clocks.
To enable Alice to record useful timestamps when
collecting evidence, we normalize all timestamps to the
same timezone (UTC). Nevertheless, there will be some
differences, due to both the propagation delay δ1 and
the (inevitable) discrepancy δ2 between the monitor’s
clock and Alice’s clock. Our goal is to choose ∆ such
that typically ∆ ≥ |δ1 + δ2|; if the converse is suffi-
ciently rare, Alice and the third party can simply vary
the timestamps and retry a few times in case they get
a negative answer. Most propagation delays in the In-
ternet are below 1s, and we can keep δ2 below 2s if
the monitor and Alice have access to a reference clock,
e.g., a NTP server. Hence, ∆ = 5s should be a safe
choice; that is, it is long enough to avoid having to sub-
mit many requests to get a positive answer, and short
enough not to impact attestation performance, and not
to jeopardize privacy by increasing an attacker’s chances
of guessing a valid packet.
5.6 Adding randomness
Recall that in Section 4.4, we argued that HAL does
not compromise user privacy because, even under very
favorable conditions, an attacker would have to issue a
very large number of queries in order to get any useful
information. A crucial argument was that the attacker
would have to guess at least one entire packet, including
quasi-random header fields such as the source port num-
ber, the IPID, and the TCP sequence number, which
together create a search space of 264. In practice, how-
ever, there are packets that lack some or all of these
fields, and there are OSes that do not properly ran-
domize them (for example, the IPID is sometimes set
to zero). Moreover, if the attacker is very powerful or
has additional information, even 64 bits may not afford
enough protection.
If this is a concern, the monitor can add more ran-
domness to upstream packets before it processes them
further.3 For example, the monitor could transparently
3This requires the monitor to be on the data path, rather
than on a mirrored port.
replace the three header fields, analogous to a NAT de-
vice; some modern firewalls already randomize the ini-
tial TCP sequence number in this way to prevent at-
tackers from hijacking TCP connections. Or the moni-
tor could add a few extra random bytes to each packet,
e.g., in the IP header after an end-of-options-list option,
or – more cleanly – in a special HAL option. The second
approach also works for non-TCP packets that do not
contain sequence numbers and/or port numbers, such
as UDP and ICMP packets.
5.7 Attestation interface
Each coordinator implements a very simple attestation
interface. An attestation request consists of a list of tu-
ples (hi, ti) and an IP address S, where hi is the hash of
the ith packet, ti is the corresponding timestamp, and S
is the source address in the original packets. The coordi-
nator forwards this information to the monitor to whose
access link S was assigned at the relevant time; the mon-
itor identifies the access link that was assigned address
S at the relevant time, then opens the corresponding
log, and finally checks for each tuple how many records
containing hi exist in the interval [ti − ∆, ti + ∆]. The
monitor then returns this information to the coordina-
tor. If no such tuples exist, the coordinator returns a
negative attestation, otherwise it issues a positive one.
To enable customers whose local provider does not
support HAL to obtain attestations, the attestation in-
terface should be publicly accessible. However, a denial-
of-service attack could cause online attestation requests
to be dropped or delayed. To mitigate this problem,
the coordinator can use standard DoS defenses; for ex-
ample, it could ask each requester to solve a client puz-
zle [17], and it could increase the difficulty of the puzzles
when it becomes overloaded. Note that DoS attacks can
only affect online attestation requests. For high-stakes
evidence, e.g., in a criminal investigation, it is always
possible to physically retrieve a copy of the log stored
in the monitor and inspect it offline.
5.8 Middleboxes on the path
Middleboxes can change the values of normally invari-
ant header fields or even the bodies of IP packets. Thus,
care must be taken to ensure that HAL can attest to
packets in the presence of such boxes.
We first consider NATs and firewalls, the most com-
mon form of middleboxes. On the sender’s side, it suf-
fices to ensure that the HAL monitor is placed upstream
of any NAT or firewall associated with a subscriber’s
access link; this is a natural position for the monitor.
On the receiver’s side, the best approach is to record
offending network traffic outside the NAT or firewall,
because such packets can be directly attested. Security-
conscious organizations log traffic at this point anyway,
because it allows them to record all traffic, including
8
failed attempts to breach the NAT/firewall. Moreover,
the most popular targets of offending traffic are servers,
which have public addresses.
However, let us assume a case where the only evi-
dence of offending traffic is recorded at a device inside
a private network. Packets recorded at such a device
would have a private local address and port. To en-
able a HAL attestation, the corresponding header fields
must be translated to the external address/port number
used by the NAT/firewall. Many middleboxes support
the UPnP Internet Gateway Device (IGD) protocol [37],
which can be used to obtain this information on-line.
Failing that, the required information has to be looked
up manually in the middlebox’s logs.
Finally, let us consider transparent middleboxes that
change the bodies of IP packets. Such devices are of-
ten used to reduce the bandwidth requirements of rich
media content at the edge of cellular networks, and by
some ISPs to insert advertisements. While such devices
would defeat attestation of modified packets, this may
be of little practical consequence. First, organizations
running such devices would normally also monitor of-
fending traffic at the public side of the device to protect
their customers. Second, the middlebox does not mod-
ify control packets, and it is usually sufficient to obtain
an attestation for one packet of a flow.
5.9 Resellers and multihomed customers
HAL actually supports a more general scenario than the
one depicted in Figure 2. For example, some customers
can choose between multiple providers that share the
same access link. This happens, for instance, when one
company has a dominant position in the access market
and is forced by regulators to resell connectivity to other
organizations. In this case, the company that owns the
access links typically tags the traffic with a link identi-
fier (e.g., a MPLS label) and then forwards the traffic to
the corresponding provider. Thus, each provider could
run its own monitor and use the link identifiers to as-
sociate traffic with specific customers.
Multihomed customers are another special case. If a
customer has been assigned its own IP range but for
some reason cannot run a monitor, his providers must
interconnect their monitors; one of them acts as the
primary monitor and forwards any requests it cannot
answer to the secondary monitors. If the customer uses
a different IP range for each access link, no special ac-
tion is required.
6. FEASIBILITY STUDY
Next, we focus on the question whether a HAL deploy-
ment in the Internet would be feasible. We begin with a
simple back-of-the-envelope calculation to estimate the
cost of a global deployment; then we show that even a
simple monitor device built from inexpensive commod-
ity hardware would easily be able to handle the worst-
case traffic on a DOCSIS upstream channel.
6.1 Global deployment
Recall that, from a technical perspective, HAL is ex-
tremely simple. If we assume for a moment that queries
are relatively infrequent, HAL basically hashes each packet
at the upstream link and stores the resulting hashes for
some time. What would it take to do this for every
single packet that is being sent in the Internet today?
A forecast performed by Cisco [6] estimates the global
amount of IP traffic in 2011 at 28,491 PB per month.
If we assume that the average packet size is 300 bytes
(based on [34]) that would be about 9.5·1016 packets per
month. If we assume that we need 24 bytes of storage
per packet (for a 20-byte hash and a 4-byte timestamp)
and that each packet has to be remembered for one
month, then it would take 2, 279 PB of storage, or about
1, 140, 000 commodity hard disks, to store this data.
Since the Internet consists of about 36, 000 autonomous
systems [4], we arrive at about 32 disks per autonomous
system, which certainly seems feasible.
What about hashing? openssl speed shows that a
single core of a commodity CPU (Intel E8400 3GHz)
can calculate SHA-1 hashes at about 3.17 Gbps; special-
purpose hardware could probably do even better. How-
ever, since some CPU power is needed for I/O, we con-
servatively estimate the effective hashing throughput
at 100 Mbps, i.e., about 3% of the maximum. Since
the Cisco forecast suggests an average Internet traffic
of 85, 099 Gbps, it would take only about 850, 990 of
these cores, or about 24 per autonomous system, to
hash the entire traffic. In other words, hashing is very
very cheap.
Of course, this back-of-the-envelope calculation is far
from perfect. For example, one would have to provision
some additional storage to handle load spikes, and so
on. But even if we have underestimated the cost by an
order of magnitude, a global deployment of HAL still
seems feasible.
6.2 Monitor prototype
To substantiate our claim about the achievable hash-
ing throughput, and to provide some reassurance that
we have not missed any major practical issues, we have
built and evaluated a monitor prototype that is based
on commodity hardware. Our prototype is implemented
as a pair of Linux daemons. The first daemon has two
threads: One reads raw packets from one network inter-
face, associates them with a specific customer4, stores
their hashes in a memory buffer, and then forwards
4The daemon uses the source IP to map packets to cus-
tomers, which assumes that the CMTS already performs
ingress filtering. If not, an MPLS flow label could be used
instead.
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Figure 3: Forwarding performance for different
packet sizes and traffic rates, and additional la-
tency caused by the monitor.
the packets to another network interface. The second
thread periodically writes the contents of the buffer to
disk sequentially. In addition to the logs, this daemon
also creates a simple index that contains one timestamp
for every 4, 096 hashes and the associated disk address.
The second daemon is responsible for answering any
incoming attestation requests. It keeps the index in
memory; when a request comes in, it performs a binary
search on the index to find the start of a 2∆ window
around the requested timestamps, and then sequentially
reads at least 2∆’s worth of hashes and timestamps from
the log. Finally, it scans the resulting data for the re-
quested hashes and timestamps, counts the occurrences,
signs a positive or negative attestation as appropriate,
and returns the attestation to the requester.
Our prototype implementation consists of only 1, 329
lines of C code, as counted by the number of semicolons.
When configured with a minimal Linux kernel and no
other services running, the software is simple enough so
that it can be hardened against attacks.
6.3 Experimental setup
We ran the prototype on a Dell Optiplex 760 worksta-
tion that was running a Linux 2.6.31 kernel. The ma-
chine had a 3.16 GHz Intel E8500 CPU, 3GB of memory,
and two Gigabit Ethernet cards: One for incoming traf-
fic and one for outgoing traffic. For storage, we used two
external CnMemory hard disks, each with a capacity of
1.5 TB. In most of our experiments, we injected syn-
thetic network traffic on the first card and captured the
forwarded packets from the second card. The prototype
was configured with a 2048-bit RSA key.
6.4 Performance: Recording
An HAL monitor must be able to sustain the worst-
case aggregate upstream traffic of the access links that
are connected to it. To measure the throughput our
prototype can handle, we injected synthetic CBR traffic
into the monitor. We varied the transmission rate in
packets per second, using either a constant packet size
between 64 and 1500 bytes or packet sizes drawn from a
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Figure 4: Jitter introduced by the monitor in
a pass-through deployment. We define jitter as
95th percentile delay minus minimum delay.
distribution observed at a regional ISP [34]. Each flow
lasted for 60 seconds. Since a real monitor must handle
recording and attestation at the same time, we flooded
the monitor with attestation requests during the entire
experiment.
Figure 3 shows the achieved throughput, as well as
the median increase in latency caused by the monitor,
compared to the minimum direct transmission time be-
tween the sender and the receiver. While the monitor is
not saturated, the latency increase is very low; it reaches
570 µs for the largest packet size. After saturation, the
latency increases due to queueing delays. The satura-
tion points are between 39 Mbps for the smallest packet
size and 700 Mbps for the largest; with the packet size
mix, it is about 300 Mbps. Regardless of the packet size,
saturation occurs at around 70, 000 packets/sec, which
suggests that our simple user-level prototype is bottle-
necked by the number of kernel/user transitions, and
that a kernel-level implementation could achieve even
better performance.
We conclude that even a simple monitor built from
commodity-hardware can easily handle the worst-case
traffic on a DOCSIS upstream channel. Furthermore,
this setup should scale seamlessly to a large provider by
placing a monitor next to each CMTS.
6.5 Performance: Loss and jitter
Next, we measured the loss rate and the latency dis-
tribution in the experiment described earlier; we report
the 95th percentile latency minus the minimum latency
as jitter. Figures 4 and 5 show our results. Below the
saturation point, the jitter is consistently lower than
0.5 ms, which is low enough to be compatible with jitter-
sensitive protocols such as VoIP or TCP Vegas. We did
not observe any packet loss at throughputs below the
saturation point.
6.6 Performance: Attestation requests
Next, we measured the rate at which our prototype can
answer attestation requests. To answer a request, the
daemon must read at least 2∆’s worth of hashes around
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Figure 5: Loss rate introduced by the monitor
in a pass-through deployment scenario.
Operation Sparse log Dense log
Disk reads 43 ms 70 ms
RSA signature 10 ms 10 ms
Other 1 ms 1 ms
Total 54 ms 81 ms
Table 1: Average response times for attestation
requests when the log is dense or sparse.
the requested timestamp. The relevant location in the
log can be found efficiently using the in-memory index,
but the actual read must typically go to disk because
the logs are much larger than main memory, so caching
is not likely to be effective unless there is significant
locality in the requested timestamps.
Since the size of the 2∆ window depends on the packet
density in the log, we performed measurements with
two different logs, a dense log with 50, 000 packets/sec
(close to the packet rate that would saturate a DOC-
SIS upstream port with minimum-sized TCP packets)
and a sparse log with 10, 000 packets/sec. The total
size of each log was 1 TB. We saturated the daemon
with attestation requests, whose timestamps we picked
uniformly at random from the time period covered by
the log, and we measured the average response times.
Table 1 shows our results. The response time is dom-
inated by the time required for the disk access, and it
stays well below 100 ms, even for the dense log.
6.7 Summary
HAL’s main costs are CPU power for hashing packets,
and space for storing the resulting hashes. Assuming a
per-packet storage requirement of 24 bytes and a hash-
ing throughput of 100 Mbps, we have estimated that
an average AS would need about 32 disks and 24 cores
(more for larger ASes, less for smaller ones). Using a
prototype implementation of a HAL monitor on com-
modity hardware, we have shown that these assump-
tions are realistic, and in the case of throughput even a
bit conservative. In the absence of overload, our moni-
tor also had no significant effect on quality metrics such
as latency, jitter, or packet loss rate.
It is worth noting that there are many types of over-
head HAL (unlike most comparable systems) does not
have, and which we therefore have not evaluated. For
example, HAL does not require any processing at core
routers, it does not increase the size of packet headers,
and it does not require any changes to existing protocols
or applications.
7. DEPLOYMENT
Having shown evidence that an HAL deployment is tech-
nically feasible, we now consider the question how such a
deployment might come to pass. Specifically, we ask 1)
whether HAL can be deployed incrementally, 2) whether
there are incentives for deployment, and 3) whether a
full deployment is realistic.
7.1 Incremental deployment
Recall that HAL does not require any changes to exist-
ing protocols or applications. Therefore, an ISP could
essentially deploy HAL today by installing our monitor
software on an old workstation, by putting that work-
station next to an edge router (DSLAM, CMTS, ...),
and by connecting the workstation to a mirrored up-
stream port on that router. Such a deployment would
immediately be useful; there would be no need to wait
until other ISPs have deployed HAL or, indeed, to de-
ploy the system on all access links at the same time.
7.2 Incentives for early adopters
The long-term benefit of HAL would be the ability to
handle offending traffic more effectively. However, both
customers and providers also have an immediate in-
centive for deploying HAL, even if they are the first
adopters. Honest customers benefit because they are
protected from false accusations, which (as we have
shown) are not uncommon today and can have devastat-
ing consequences. Providers benefit because HAL helps
with complaint handling: with HAL in place, providers
can ask complainants for a positive attestation before
they even look at a complaint. If a positive attestation
does exist, they are on much firmer ground when taking
action against the offender.
Quantitatively, we must weigh these incentives against
the price tag. While we cannot claim to be experts in
ISP economics, we can at least roughly estimate the
likely cost to get a ballpark figure. Let us assume the
provider is a cable ISP. Recent studies of broadband
traffic [5, 24, 33, 34] have shown that the average up-
stream transmission rate of broadband customers is about
15 packets per second. If 100 customers share the same
CMTS and hashes are stored for one month, about
96.4 GB of storage would be needed. Off-the-shelf mir-
rored RAID storage costs about $0.30/GB. If we factor
in the cost of a $2k server blade, assume an equipment
lifetime of five years with an annual disk replacement
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rate of 3% [30], and further assume that operational
costs including energy and admin costs will double the
hardware cost, we arrive at a rough estimate of $0.68
per customer per month.
7.3 Other deployment options
It is difficult to say how much customers would be will-
ing to pay for the protection that HAL provides them
personally. The situation is somewhat analogous to
buying home insurance – events like burglaries are typ-
ically rare, but their effects can be devastating when
they do occur. Therefore, we also discuss another po-
tential deployment option.
Suppose users do not value the direct benefits of HAL
enough to become early adopters, but suppose they do
value the overall benefits of a widespread deployment
– namely the ability to handle offending traffic more
effectively. This would be a typical instance of a mar-
ket failure: joining the system would produce positive
externalities, but without remuneration for the joiner.
Market failures are a well-known phenomenon in eco-
nomics, and there is a variety of instruments that can
be used to overcome them, such as subsidies or regula-
tory action. Whether or not such instruments should
be used is a policy question, which we do not address
here. We merely point out that relying on market forces
is not the only way to deploy a system like HAL.
7.4 Is a full deployment realistic?
It seems safe to assume that, for most providers, the
large majority of their customers are honest and would
stand to profit from HAL. However, it is known that
some providers send a lot more offending traffic than
others; for instance, McColo provided hosting for major
botnets [23]. So it is possible that, even if HAL were de-
ployed almost universally, some providers would exploit
a “business niche” by offering Internet access to senders
of offending traffic. Such providers would clearly not de-
ploy HAL voluntarily, and our assumption of providers
do not collude with users would not hold for them.
However, we argue that such a situation would al-
ready be a huge success. If most of the world’s senders
of offending traffic were concentrated at a small num-
ber of providers, it would become possible to set up
special cases for these providers, e.g., by blocking or
rate-limiting their traffic. If they continued sending of-
fending traffic, it seems likely that many of them would
eventually share McColo’s fate, which was disconnected
by its upstream providers in November 2008.
8. CASE STUDY
To demonstrate the usefulness of HAL, we built an auto-
mated Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) com-
plaint handling system that relies on HAL to validate
complaints against the ISP’s customers.
8.1 The problem
The DMCA includes a provision that allows copyright
owners to file complaints regarding copyright infringe-
ment. ISPs that want to take advantage of certain pro-
tections against legal action regarding such copyright
violations must be willing to handle and act upon these
complaints. The larger the volume of complaints, the
more costly it is for the ISP to both validate the com-
plaints and verify claims from their customers that they
are being falsely accused.
To gauge the volume of complaints that are received
by large edge networks today, we obtained data from
two large U.S. universities, each with more than 20, 000
students. Each receives more than 2, 000 complaints
per year. One university provided us with a detailed
breakdown, which shows that more than 80% of the
complaints are DMCA notices. These are generated
by sites like BayTSP, which, on its web site, reports
sending more than one million DMCA takedown notices
each month.
We also confirmed that the universities we contacted
take some steps to validate the complaint, e.g., to rule
out MAC spoofing. Further, users do occasionally dis-
pute the evidence and assert their innocence; this again
illustrates the two problems we described in Section 3.2
and the resulting dilemma for the operator.
8.2 Using attestation to validate complaints
We implemented a web-based service that enables ISPs
to automatically process the DMCA complaints they
receive. Our service uses HAL to validate these com-
plaints, thus avoiding false accusations against its cus-
tomers. The implementation consists of 121 lines of
HTML, 92 lines of PHP scripts, and 565 lines of C code.
Our complaint handling service provides a web inter-
face for copyright holders to upload not only the stan-
dard information that is required by law, but also a (set
of) packet(s) that show the alleged offense (e.g., a few
packets that contain part of the copyrighted material).
Recall that most complaints are filed by automated ser-
vices even today. These services can easily provide such
evidence, e.g., by capturing packet traces on their hon-
eypots; administrators could do the same using tools
such as tcpdump.
The packets that are part of the complaint are then
attested automatically using HAL, and in case the at-
testation is positive the provider can be confident in
taking action against the user. Thus our system is ad-
vantageous both for the users, who are protected from
false accusations, and especially for the provider who is
able to (1) avoid an expensive and error-prone manual
verification upon receiving the request, (2) handle in-
nocence claims from his customers more effectively, and
(3) avoid false accusations against its customers, which
are awkward for provider and customer alike.
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9. DISCUSSION
9.1 HAL and anonymous communication
At first glance, it might seem that HAL removes a le-
gitimate (albeit weak) degree of user anonymity in the
current Internet. There are two things to note here.
First, the reality is that the current Internet provides
neither useful anonymity nor useful evidence of packet
origin at the network level. Source addresses can be
mapped to individuals and cause suspicion and embar-
rassment; but by themselves they are not strong enough
to justify serious measures against the suspected source,
and may not hold up in a court of law.
Second, HAL provides a form of nonrepudiation at
the IP layer. However, it does not affect anonymity (or
lack thereof) at the application (session) level. Anony-
mous end-to-end communication can be implemented at
the application level through the use of an anonymizing
overlay network, regardless of whether HAL is in place.
In such an overlay, HAL can establish whether a packet
was sent by a particular overlay node, but it cannot
establish whether that node originated the packet.
9.2 Extension: Traffic capture
HAL can confirm that a given packet originated from
an access link, i.e., it corroborates available information
about offensive Internet traffic. It does not show by it-
self which packets were sent or received by a given sub-
scriber. Such information would be useful, for instance,
to show that a subscriber’s computer was compromised
and used as part of a multi-stage attack.
To provide this information, HAL could be combined
with traffic logging on customer premises equipment
(CPE), e.g., a home router. This combination preserves
subscriber’s privacy yet provides valuable evidence that
can show a subscriber’s innocence and allow law en-
forcement agents to follow the trail to the upstream
source of a multi-stage attack. Subscriber privacy is
protected because the subscriber can decide if, when
and what information to disclose, and control how long
to store the information in order to limit exposure in
case of a subpoena. Yet, a malicious subscriber cannot
fabricate false evidence because the packets stored on
the CPE can be validated by the hashes stored inde-
pendently by the network access provider.
Traffic capture on CPE requires that the network ac-
cess provider stores hashes of both upstream and down-
stream traffic, doubling the storage required. Moreover,
the CPE must store full traffic information. Behav-
ioral studies of residential broadband customers [5] have
shown that on average customers transfer very modest
amounts of data (e.g., downloaded 862 MB per day in
2008) allowing multiple day’s worth of traffic to eas-
ily fit in common hard disks. But even in the extreme
case of a customer fully utilizing a high-end broadband
connection with 100 Mbps, the customer would only be
able to transfer around 1 TB of traffic per day which
still allows one day worth of traffic to be stored in a
single commodity hard disk.
Despite its costs, this type of traffic capture may
be worthwhile, given that it provides network access
providers and law enforcement agencies additional ev-
idence to investigate multi-stage attacks, and enables
customers to clear their names if they fell victim to a
multi-stage attack. A full study and evaluation of this
and related approaches remains as future work.
10. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed packet attestation. Packet
attestation corroborates available evidence about ma-
licious activity in the Internet, by verifying whether
a specific packet originated from a particular access
link. Packet attestation enables swift action to stop
an ongoing attack and can convince ISPs to take ac-
tion against a subscriber while protecting falsely ac-
cused subscribers. In the case of a multi-stage attack,
packet attestation provides a starting point for an inves-
tigation of the ultimately responsible party. Moreover,
packet attestation can be combined with traffic logging
on customer premises equipment to provide additional
evidence in the case of multi-stage attacks.
We think that packet attestation occupies a sweet
spot in the trade-off between the strength of its evi-
dence on one hand, subscriber privacy and deployability
on the other. Packet attestation protects individual pri-
vacy since it merely confirms what the querier already
knows. Moreover, packet attestation does not require
changes to either the network core or to end systems,
and can be deployed at reasonable cost today.
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